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WHY CYCLICALITY MATTERS TO ACCESS 
TO MORTGAGE CREDIT 
PATRICIA A. MCCOY* 
SUSAN M. WACHTER** 
Abstract: Virtually no attention has been paid to the problem of cyclicality in 
debates over access to mortgage credit, despite its importance as a driver of 
tight credit. Housing markets are prone to booms accompanied by bubbles in 
mortgage credit in which lenders cut underwriting standards, leading to ele-
vated loan defaults. During downturns, these cycles artificially impede access 
to mortgage credit for underserved communities. During upswings, these cy-
cles make homeownership unnecessarily precarious for many who attain it. 
This volatility exacerbates wealth and income disparities by ethnicity and 
race. The boom-bust cycle must be addressed in order to assure healthy and 
sustainable access to credit for creditworthy borrowers. Although the inherent 
cyclicality of the housing finance market cannot be fully eliminated, it can be 
mitigated to some extent. Mitigation is possible because housing market cy-
cles are financed by and fueled by debt. Policymakers have already begun to 
develop a suite of countercyclical tools to help iron out the peaks and troughs 
of the residential mortgage market. In this article, we discuss why access to 
credit is intrinsically linked to cyclicality and canvass possible techniques to 
modulate the extremes in those cycles. 
INTRODUCTION 
Virtually no attention has been paid to cyclicality in debates over ac-
cess to mortgage credit, despite its importance as a driver of tight credit. 
Cyclicality refers to the propensity of housing markets to undergo bubbles 
in which real estate values soar, then crash, wiping out home equity. These 
real estate booms are typically accompanied by bubbles in mortgage credit 
in which lenders cut underwriting standards, producing a surfeit of bad 
loans. 
During downturns, these cycles artificially impede access to mortgage 
credit. During upswings, these cycles make homeownership unnecessarily 
precarious for those who attain it. When mortgage credit is expanding, a 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2017, Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter. All rights reserved.
 
 * Liberty Mutual Insurance Professor, Boston College Law School. Email: patri-
cia.mccoy@bc.edu. 
 ** Albert Sussman Professor of Real Estate and Finance, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. Email: wachter@wharton.upenn.edu. 
362 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:361 
cycle can ensue in which growth in home loans fuels a surge in home prices 
beyond sustainable levels based on fundamentals, setting up a future bust. 
At some point, home prices surpass the purchasing power of homebuyers. 
Then demand starts to fall and home prices start to slip. A slowdown in the 
economy ensues. Newly-unemployed borrowers who are having difficulty 
making their loan payments discover, due to loss in home equity, that they 
can no longer retire their loans by selling their homes or refinancing their 
mortgages. With no way out, distressed borrowers start defaulting on their 
loans, further depressing home prices and household purchasing power. 
Production is slashed, layoffs ensue, and the economy goes into recession. 
At that point, the cycle reverts from a glut to a paucity of credit. 
Banks, reeling from loan losses, curtail lending in order to hoard cash. 
Without intervention, the economy may continue its downward cycle. With 
fiscal and monetary stimulus, the economy and the housing market can re-
gain their footing. However, even when the economy starts to recover, 
banks remain risk averse and home loans remain difficult to get. The weak 
supply of loans is compounded by weak demand occasioned by job loss, 
consumer pessimism, and tarnished credit scores. Meanwhile, the loss in 
home equity wipes out the most important source of wealth for many 
households. 
If we do not address this intrinsic cyclicality, the housing market will 
continue to experience boom-bust cycles, leaving destruction in their wake. 
This destruction includes widespread evictions, mass unemployment, severe 
contractions in credit, depressed homeownership rates, and heightened im-
pediments to wealth formation for minority and lower-income households. 
Wealth and income disparities for the affected families will continue to 
widen in the process. 
Although the inherent cyclicality of the housing finance market cannot 
be fully eliminated for reasons we explain, it can be mitigated to some ex-
tent. Mitigation is possible because housing market cycles are financed by 
and fueled by debt. Policymakers have begun to develop a suite of counter-
cyclical tools to help iron out the peaks and troughs of the residential mort-
gage market. In this article, we discuss why access to credit is intrinsically 
linked to cyclicality and canvass possible techniques to modulate the ex-
tremes in those cycles. 
I. WHAT MAKES HOUSING AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE  
CREDIT PRONE TO CYCLICALITY? 
Historically, the worst financial crises globally have resulted from real 
estate bubbles combined with imprudent mortgage lending by banks. (Her-
ring & Wachter 1999, 1–2; Reinhart & Rogoff 2009, xliv–xlv, 158–62; 
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Schularick & Taylor 2012, 1032). What is it about housing that makes this 
asset class more volatile and destructive than other assets? After all, stocks 
and tulips are also susceptible to over-optimism. (Shiller 2015, 170–73). 
Three features distinguish housing from other asset markets, which un-
like housing, usually involve commodities. First, housing is intrinsically 
linked to credit markets because most families need financing in order to 
purchase a home, given the large cost of this asset. In the process, credit 
expansion follows price rises through short-sighted bank lending. (Bernan-
ke & Gertler 1989, 15, 28; Herring & Wachter 1999, 11–12). Second, if 
housing values start to inflate artificially, there are no proven effective 
short-selling strategies to constrain them.1 (Wachter 2016, 210–11). In part, 
housing values over-inflate because investors do not grasp the true overall 
level of risk as danger in the housing system mounts because the aggregate 
level of risky lending is hard to know. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, 18–19). 
Finally, defaults on home mortgages often result in eviction through fore-
closure, which dumps empty properties on the market and further depresses 
the price of homes. (Id., 6). 
Residential property bubbles inflict particularly devastating damage on 
the financial system and the economy because most homes are financed by 
mortgage loans and form the single largest liability on household balance 
sheets. As such, bubbles in home values go hand-in-hand with credit bub-
bles. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, at 6–7, 9; Wachter 2016, 211). Mortgage 
financing makes housing bubbles especially severe because of their linkage 
to the banking system. Banks are inherently fragile, due to the term mis-
match between their short-term liabilities (in the form of demand deposits) 
and their longer-term, illiquid assets (including loans). This term mismatch 
exposes banks to runs on deposits, which puts them at increased risk of sol-
vency. (Diamond 2007, 197–99). To compound matters, banks have a high 
degree of counterparty exposure to one another and to other financial insti-
tutions through the web of correspondent accounts and the payment system. 
(Judge 2013, 1275–77). 
One technique banks use to attempt to limit these risks—basing loan 
amounts on the appraised value of real estate—does not work because the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 One might ask why commercial investment-grade real estate can be shorted, when single-
family homes cannot? First, commercial real estate can trade through real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), which can be sold short. Second, commercial properties generally do not go empty when 
they have to be exchanged in a distressed scenario, thereby reducing concerns about excess sup-
ply. Third, commercial properties produce cash flow in the form of rent whether they are dis-
tressed, and that cash flow can be priced. In a related vein, the income constraints of commercial 
property borrowers do not matter in the way they do in the residential sphere, because commercial 
real estate loans are largely based on the expected cash flow paid by tenants, whereas owner-
occupied homes do not generate cash flow. Finally, if lending conditions freeze, equity investors 
can step in, which makes the commercial real estate market less reliant on debt financing. 
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appraised value reflects market value, which itself is artificially raised by 
over-lending. (Herring & Wachter 1999, 19). A second control, which gen-
erally works well in lending decisions for industrial and commodity lend-
ing, also fails. In typical industrial and commodity loans, this control con-
sists of the fact that as lending over-expands industry capacity and opera-
tions, prices fall and the resulting losses and economic distress serve as a 
signal to stop lending. But in the real estate arena, the impact of eased lend-
ing is higher housing prices as demand expands with the easing of lending 
and the supply response is at best delayed. Because housing is owned as an 
investment as well as for consumption, higher housing prices increase de-
mand. Potential homeowners form their expectations of future prices based 
on past gains. (Shiller 2015, 204–06). Although more forward-looking in-
vestors may see the opportunity for profit from short selling as is the case 
for other assets when they become inflated, there is no way for homeowners 
to sell their homes when prices are high and buy back their homes when 
prices deflate (Wachter 2016, 209–11), as discussed further below. Moreo-
ver, the higher prices stop defaults even when lenders are making loans that 
are not sustainable. Borrowers who cannot pay sell to avoid foreclosure as 
prices rise. Therefore, there is a false sense of optimism in real estate lend-
ing which can even cause lending standards to be lifted wholesale. 
In a housing finance bubble, banks are prone to become over-
leveraged in the rush to lend more. This tendency is exacerbated by moral 
hazard, both in the form of expected government bailouts and procyclical 
capital requirements that leave banks undercapitalized when funding is 
needed. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(the Dodd-Frank Act) does not solve for this because the expected short-run 
gains can be way over any required percentage of deal-required holdings. 
Thus, the new credit risk retention rule that requires sponsors of mortgage-
backed securities to hold 5% of the credit risk of the underlying mortgag-
es—and the further exemption from the 5% requirement for deals backed 
solely by qualified mortgages (Department of the Treasury et al. 2014, 
77607)—does not stop moral hazard.2 
Meanwhile, short-term managerial incentives encourage myopic lend-
ing. The current fees associated with making loans benefit the managers and 
shareholders. These profits are taken by both up-front. High home prices 
allow these loans to be made without any obvious sign of distress in the 
market because rising prices prevent defaults. The expected long-run losses 
which managers may be aware of (if they expect that prices are way out of 
line) are not of interest because this is in the long run when they may no 
                                                                                                                           
 2 However, the risk retention requirement makes sense for commercial mortgage-backed 
securities for the reasons explained in footnote 1. 
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longer be at the firm. The only thing that can be done now is to produce 
profits through fees when they can be produced, now. In fact, any expected 
long-term losses may only exacerbate the cycle as they push lenders who 
may be in the know to lend more now, as in the famous Countrywide “Hus-
tle” loan program. (Levine 2016). Although not all lenders are myopic, 
those lenders that are will gain market share. (Wachter 2016, 211). 
Subsequently, when property values slump and loan defaults spike, the 
ensuing losses jeopardize the solvency of banks and leave bank failures in 
their wake. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009, 11; Reinhart & Rogoff 2009, 141–42, 
147–55). One bank’s failure can lead to the failure of others due to their 
interconnectedness. (Judge 2013, 1302–03). Bank failures can similarly 
spread when fire sales of assets by distressed banks depress the same cate-
gories of assets held by other banks. (Allen & Carletti 2013, 123; Diamond 
2007, 196–97; Kaufman & Scott 2003, 372). Mounting losses and failures 
at banks will result in contraction of credit, with serious negative spillover 
effects for manufacturing, employment, and the larger economy. 
There is another peculiar aspect to housing that exacerbates the down-
ward stroke of the cycle, which involves the way in which defaults on resi-
dential mortgages are typically resolved. Most home mortgage defaults re-
sult in foreclosure and eviction of the occupants from the home. In the pro-
cess, foreclosures pump empty, often decrepit homes onto the sales market, 
bloating supply and further depressing home prices. In a financial accelera-
tor that amplifies the harm, falling prices trigger a fresh round of defaults 
and foreclosures, which put more downward pressure on home prices. 
(Bernanke & Gertler 1989, 15, 28; Levitin & Wachter 2013, 6, 20). 
The recent financial crisis and its aftermath epitomized the potential 
magnitude of this type of crash. More than 9.6 million residential foreclo-
sures were completed between second quarter 2005 and first quarter 2015.3 
(Spader & Herbert 2017, 277). Meanwhile, from 2007 through 2010, the 
median price for new homes dropped 22% (Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis 2016), and the median household’s net worth declined 38.8%. (Brick-
er et al. 2012, 16–17). 
In markets featuring commodities, bearish investors can use short sales 
to place a brake on incipient bubbles by borrowing an asset and selling it at 
the prevailing, inflated price. If the investor correctly bets that the price will 
drop before the due date for returning the asset, he or she can later buy it at 
a lower price, return the asset to the original owner, and pocket the profit. 
                                                                                                                           
 3 The 9.6 million includes rental properties that were investor-owned. Spader and Herbert 
(2017, 277–78) estimate that owner-occupied homes accounted for 4.8 to 5.8 million of the total 
9.6 million foreclosures. 
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But this strategy does not work in real estate, because investors cannot 
convey title to land they do not own. And even if they could, they would not 
have assurance that they could buy the exact same parcel back. Purchasing 
another parcel as a substitute would be impossible because every piece of 
real estate is unique. (Wachter 2016, 210–11). Both problems impede short 
sales in owned residential housing, in particular as homeowners (unless 
they are investors) own to live in that neighborhood and in that home. As an 
extensive literature shows (Sinai & Souleles 2005, 763–64), they own to 
hedge the risk that rents may rise precluding their staying in the neighbor-
hood and region to which they are attached for job and other reasons. Sell-
ing their home and becoming renters exposes them to risk of rent rises as 
well as to the very high transaction costs involved in buying and selling a 
house. This is in addition to the loss of their home. Most homeowners place 
a far higher value on their home than the market does because of personal 
associations. 
In the run-up to the 2008 crisis, short sales strategies were devised for 
private–label mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations 
(Lewis 2010, 72–74), but those strategies were limited in scope and did not 
affect market-wide pricing. Those investors engaged in short sales for only 
a few issues of mortgage-related securities. Those bonds were marked to 
model, not to market, and lacked liquidity because they did not trade wide-
ly. As a result, the pricing of mortgage-related bonds did not change due to 
this short sales activity and those bonds remained underpriced, reflecting 
decreased perceived risk. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, 16). 
Because of the absence of a robust short sale market in housing and re-
lated financial instruments, when housing values rise, the price sentiments 
of optimists prevail over those of pessimists, further driving up home pric-
es. Mortgage lenders then reinforce the price expectations of optimists by 
deciding how much to lend based on appraisals, which impound the rise in 
home values. (Herring & Wachter 1999, 19, 74). Simultaneously, myopic 
lenders become brash about lending to weaker borrowers on looser terms, 
out of the conviction that rising collateral values will protect them if the 
borrowers default. Cautious lenders find it hard to compete with lax lenders 
and a race to the bottom in underwriting standards ensues. As easy credit 
expands the pool of prospective borrowers, homebuyers and current home-
owners flock to take out or refinance mortgages, adding to the upward push 
on home prices. The result is over-leveraging, as weaker borrowers incur 
mortgage debts that they later cannot repay. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 15–42; 
Wachter 2016, 211–13). 
As noted, in the short term, most observers fail to recognize the com-
ing storm because the surge in home prices masks the rising default risk. 
(Levitin & Wachter 2013, 10, 12, 15–19; Wachter 2016, 209, 211–13). 
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While part of this myopia is behavioral in nature, part of it is structural. 
Even market actors who were so inclined could not take aggregate risk into 
account because they lack the information to know how much underwriting 
has declined at other banks or how leveraged those banks have become. Ac-
cordingly, most market actors caught up in a bubble fail to appreciate the 
impending tail risk and do not have the tools to price it. (Levitin & Wachter 
2015, 1245; Wachter 2016, 220). 
Other forces that might rein in a bubble also often break down. Mana-
gerial compensation typically adds to credit bubbles by rewarding loan of-
ficers and mortgage brokers for the volume of loans that they make, not the 
successful performance of loans. This encourages officers and brokers to 
expand the number of loans by qualifying weaker borrowers through riskier 
types of loans. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 32–33; Wachter 2016, 212). Inves-
tors in mortgage-related securities may not exercise adequate restraint both 
because of market mania and because those instruments are too opaque for 
them to understand the credit risk they are assuming. (Levitin & Wachter 
2013, 16–19). Regulators often succumb to the same optimism as market 
actors and fail to intervene until it is too late. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 157–
205; McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter 2009, 510; Wachter 2016, 212). 
II. CYCLICALITY MATTERS TO ACCESS TO MORTGAGE CREDIT 
Cyclicality is almost never mentioned in discussions of access to 
mortgage credit, even though impaired access to credit is a direct outgrowth 
of cyclicality. It is vital to address the extreme volatility in housing finance, 
however, not only for macroeconomic concerns but also to shine a light on 
countercyclical tools that could reduce homeowners’ exposure to destruc-
tive swings in business cycles. 
The expansion phase of the home mortgage bubble, of course, is 
marked by expansion in availability of credit. But this expansion is general-
ly accomplished in ways that sow the seeds of a disastrous contraction in 
credit later on. While a bubble is inflating, lenders expand credit in prob-
lematic ways (sometimes openly, other times through fraud). One technique 
is to make loans to borrowers with weak credit scores who are questionable 
prospects for repayment. Another is by lending to applicants who lack the 
income to manage the new debt that they incur. Eliminating or reducing 
down payment requirements to dangerous lows is a third way to qualify 
more borrowers, but at the risk of saddling them with underwater mortgages 
when property values fall. Adjustable-rate mortgages and negative amorti-
zation loans can be used to qualify borrowers, but both products expose 
borrowers to potential future payment shock. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 15–
42; Levitin & Wachter 2013, 12–13 & tbl. 1). 
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As noted, soaring home values hide a multiplicity of underwriting sins. 
That is because rising home equity provides an escape valve to borrowers 
who are having difficulty paying their mortgages. Distressed borrowers 
with sufficient home equity can sell their homes for enough to retire their 
mortgages. Alternatively, in a rising market, lenders usually will agree to 
refinance struggling borrowers into cheaper loans based on the value of the 
collateral. 
Even in the bubble phase, some refinance practices siphon off home-
owners’ equity, which undermines the wealth formation potential that oth-
erwise is inherent in homeownership. For instance, in the practice known as 
equity stripping, points and fees of refinance loans are added to the princi-
pal and refinanced (as too often is the case). The effect is to erode the 
homeowners’ equity in the home. Multiple episodes of equity stripping can 
strip out all the equity, increasing the risk of default and leaving homeown-
ers unable to access future credit. 
Widespread use of piggyback second mortgages and home equity lines 
of credit secured by junior liens can similarly leave homeowners with insuf-
ficient equity to weather a decline in home prices. The combined loan-to-
value (CLTV) ratio, which reflects the total outstanding indebtedness from 
first mortgages and junior liens, is the metric used to measure this trend. 
From 2002 through 2006, the average CLTV ratio on residential properties 
rose markedly, reaching a high of 89% in 2006, even though the average 
loan-to-value ratio for first mortgages remained relatively stable throughout 
that period. This means that most of the spike in borrowers’ leverage during 
the housing bubble was due to piggyback seconds and other junior liens. 
(Levitin & Wachter 2015, 1256 fig. 3, 1258 & fig. 5). When a bubble 
spawns a proliferation in these sorts of second liens, home equity will drop 
as a percentage of home value, increasing the risk that heavily leveraged 
borrowers will owe more than their homes are worth when property values 
eventually drop. 
This fate presages the fate of struggling homeowners more generally 
when the bubble bursts and property values slide across the board. If home 
prices plunge too far, borrowers will find their equity wiped out and their 
mortgages underwater. Borrowers who are having difficulty making their 
payments are left with no attractive options. They can no longer pay off 
their mortgages by selling their homes. Similarly, lenders will no longer 
agree to refinance their loans or extend second mortgages. Unless the bor-
rowers can marshal other assets to cover their payments, they are almost 
certain to fall delinquent on their loans. At that point, all of remaining pos-
sible outcomes—foreclosure, loss mitigation, bankruptcy, or a short sale—
will decimate the homeowner’s assets and severely damage his or her credit 
record and score. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, 19; McCoy 2013, 728–29, 734–
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35). Most of those households will revert to renters and all of them will be 
shut out of the mortgage market for at least several years. (Bhutta & Canner 
2013, 45–49; Brevoort & Cooper 2013, 748). 
As a recession begins in earnest, widening economic distress will tip 
other families into economic hardship. Some homeowners who were suc-
cessfully managing their mortgage payments before will lose their jobs as 
construction and consumption dries up and layoffs ensue. Many of those 
jobless households will fall behind on their mortgages. Even those that do 
not may no longer have the income, assets, or the creditworthiness to quali-
fy for new loans. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, 19). 
At the bottom of the lending cycle, consumers with past delinquencies 
are not the only ones affected. Creditworthy individuals will also feel the 
contraction as the mortgage market overcorrects. During and after a bubble 
burst, banks will respond by slashing credit in order to preserve capital and 
limit future buyback requests. (McCoy & Wachter 2017, 24; Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2009, 165–67, 171–73). Lending standards will tighten to such a 
degree that even loan applicants whom banks would deem creditworthy 
under normal conditions are turned down for credit. Precisely this type of 
contraction in credit ensued following the 2008 crisis, when lending re-
mained tight despite record low interest rates and home prices post World 
War II. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, 20). Researchers at the Urban Institute 
estimated, for instance, that 5.2 million more mortgages would have been 
made between 2009 and 2014 if lenders had used the same credit standards 
used in 2001, when lending was relatively safe. (Bai, Goodman & Zhu 
2016). 
These extreme swings in cycles undermine the prospects for wealth 
formation through homeownership. Homeownership is the single most im-
portant avenue for building wealth for minority and lower-income house-
holds, largely because families can use their monthly housing outlays to 
build equity. (Herbert, McCue & Sanchez-Moyano 2016, 1–2). Indeed, this 
effect is so large that the median minority or lower-income family has fewer 
total assets than the median family in this group who owns a home. For in-
stance, in 2013, the median value of the primary residence for nonwhite and 
Hispanic families who owned homes was $143,000, while the median value 
of all assets owned by nonwhite and Hispanic families that year (including 
renters) was $57,400.4 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
2014, 91, 595). When the same analysis is run by income, in 2013, the me-
                                                                                                                           
 4 The opposite pattern obtains for non-Hispanic whites, where the total assets of the median 
family exceed the median value of a family’s primary residence. Thus, the median primary resi-
dence was worth $180,000 in 2013 for white, non-Hispanic families. That same year, the median 
white, non-Hispanic family held $236,800 in total assets. (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2014, 91, 595). 
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dian primary residence was worth $80,000 for homeowners in the lowest 
income quintile, while the median value of all assets owned by the lowest 
quintile earners was only $14,600. (Id., 79, 583). These numbers mean that 
families who did not own homes had less than $57,400 or $14,600 in total 
median assets respectively for minority families and bottom-quintile wage 
earners. 
The volatility of housing finance impedes wealth formation both for 
households seeking homeownership and for those who already own homes. 
(Herbert, McCue & Sanchez-Moyano 2016, 5–6). After a mortgage bubble, 
millions of distressed borrowers can be ousted from homeownership after 
being evicted from their homes. Other, creditworthy tenants who should 
normally qualify for loans but are turned down due to overly tight credit 
lose the chance to build equity by buying homes. Following the most recent 
crisis, these conditions artificially pushed the U.S. homeownership rate 
from 2010 through 2013 2.3 percentage points (230 basis points) lower than 
if borrowing constraints that prevailed in 2001 had been in effect. (Acolin, 
Bricker, Calem & Wachter 2016, 6). 
Meanwhile, the wealth-building potential for existing homeowners is 
also harmed. Owners who remain in their homes lose home equity as a tri-
fecta of reduced demand for mortgages, reduced supply, and foreclosures 
depressing surrounding property values push home values in many locales 
down too far. This overcorrection will be temporary for many homeowners 
who can sit it out. But in the hardest-hit communities, the rash of vacant 
homes and accompanying crime—particularly in minority and lower-
income neighborhoods in inner cities—will eviscerate home equity in those 
communities for decades to come. (Mian, Sufi & Trebbi 2015, 2629). This 
problem is so serious that some Rust Belt cities, such as Detroit, are consid-
ering eliminating whole blighted neighborhoods and relocating the few res-
idents who remain. (Detroit Blight Removal Task Force Plan). 
As the latest real estate crash showed, homeownership is a double-
edged sword. (Dickerson 2014, 82, 85). For families who remain employed 
and have affordable mortgages, homeownership is an important path to 
building wealth. But for families who are victims of the crash, either be-
cause they received unsafe mortgages, lost their jobs in the ensuing reces-
sion, or owned a house on a block plagued by foreclosures, homeownership 
proved disastrous, usually leaving them in worse financial condition than 
before. 
This does not have to be the case. Unless the inherent cyclicality in 
housing and mortgage markets is confronted and addressed, however, 
homeownership will remain just as unstable as it was from recent experi-
ence. 
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III. ADDRESSING THE CYCLICALITY IN MORTGAGE CREDIT SUPPLY 
In order to iron out the cyclicality in housing and credit, we need to 
accomplish three tasks. The first is to articulate what we hope to achieve in 
reducing cyclicality, from the standpoint of access to credit. Second, we 
need to understand which risk management and regulatory interventions in 
the past may have exacerbated procyclicality. Finally, we need to identify 
and implement countercyclical tools that can reduce the volatility in hous-
ing and mortgage lending cycles. 
A. How Reducing Cyclicality Can Improve Access to Mortgage Lending 
The fallout from 2008 painfully drove home the costs of expanding the 
supply of mortgage credit beyond levels that are sustainable. As we have 
discussed, when housing bubbles and credit bubbles coincide, market par-
ticipants become prone to magical thinking and pump out mortgage loans to 
borderline borrowers on the gambit that home prices will never fall. Alt-
hough access to credit will balloon in the short term, eventually it will burst, 
resulting in eviction for possibly millions of homeowners and loan denials 
for countless others who otherwise would be worthy home borrowers. In the 
aftermath, trust among the institutions that make up the mortgage supply 
chain erodes, as each party seeks to hand off losses, or to avoid paying off 
for losses. The historical actual losses become embedded in risk models 
going forward, affecting required rates of return. The withdrawal of some 
lenders and the requirement of higher returns and standards to withstand a 
similar level crisis from others affect lending standards, particularly for the 
marginal borrower. 
Because over-lending can inflict devastating harm, maximizing home-
ownership and the supply of mortgages per se should never be society’s 
goal. Rather, we should put homeowners on the path to success by ensuring 
that their mortgages are on safe and affordable terms. In the next section, 
we discuss certain past market and regulatory techniques that ended up ex-
acerbating the volatility in housing finance. We close by identifying coun-
tercyclical techniques that are better suited to curb the violent boom-bust 
swings in homeownership and mortgage credit. 
B. Why Market and Regulatory Structures Failed to Restrain Reckless 
Lending Culminating in the Recent Crisis 
During the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, market par-
ticipants and regulators used a number of techniques that were touted to 
constrain risk but failed. These techniques turned out to be infected by pro-
cyclicality. On the surface, these practices gave market actors and regulators 
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assurance that proper risk controls were in place. But that assurance proved 
misplaced, giving investors and regulators false confidence, which pumped 
more air into the housing and credit bubbles. 
As this suggests, procyclical regulation and risk management practices 
are problematic because they are too lenient during bubbles and too strict 
during economic declines, which exacerbates oscillations in the business 
cycle. In order to reduce cyclicality in the supply of mortgage credit, we 
therefore need to identify structures and practices that worsen bubbles and 
address them. 
1. Procyclical Market Structures and Practices 
In the mortgage origination market, it is widely understood that deteri-
oration in loan underwriting standards and the quality of appraisals contrib-
uted to the 2008 crisis. But equally importantly, the growth in access to 
credit was financed by a vast influx of capital into the housing finance mar-
ket. Secondary market participants devised a host of structures and tech-
niques to inspire confidence. Those structures and techniques were faulty to 
begin with. They later failed and deepened the crisis in the process. 
a. The Mortgage Origination Market 
i. Loan Underwriting Standards 
Federal banking regulators largely took a hands-off approach to mort-
gage underwriting standards leading up to 2008, in part because they were 
sanguine that bankers and other lenders had sufficient reasons to limit the 
default risk of the loans they made and investors had sufficient reasons to 
limit the risk of their investments in mortgage-backed securities. In testi-
mony to Congress after the crisis, former Federal Reserve Board chairman 
Alan Greenspan acknowledged his own previous belief that these actors had 
“the incentive to evaluate the credit quality of what they were selling.” 
(Greenspan 2008, 3). 
During the mid-2000s credit boom, that trust proved misplaced. As we 
have documented elsewhere, key mortgage lending standards deteriorated. 
(Levitin & Wachter 2013, 12 fig. 1, 13 tbl. 1; McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter 
2009, 497 fig. 1, 505 fig. 3). The single most important determinant of de-
fault risk—the average combined loan-to-value ratio—went up during this 
period, while another crucial loan quality indicator—the percentage of full-
documentation underwriting—went down. The growing proportion of non-
traditional mortgage products such as adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), 
interest-only ARMs, and negative amortization mortgages with potential 
payment shock compounded the credit risk. (McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter 
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2009, 497 fig. 1, 505 fig. 3). Despite this burgeoning risk, spreads declined. 
(Id., 505 fig. 3). This reduction in underwriting standards, coupled with the 
proliferation of risky, nontraditional products and the lack of sufficient risk 
premia, acted procyclically by enabling legions of weak borrowers to flood 
the housing market and push up home prices. 
ii. Mortgage Appraisals 
Appraisals are essential to home mortgage lending because combined 
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios are the single most important predictor of de-
fault. (Campbell & Cocco 2011, 3; Elul et al. 2010, 6–7 & tbl. 1). Apprais-
als use several methodologies for estimating the value of homes that serve 
as the collateral. These estimates enable lenders to compute the CLTV ratio 
and determine whether a loan applicant’s down payment or home equity 
will be sufficient to contain default risk. 
Although appraisals are essential to lending, they are nevertheless pro-
cyclical in nature because they are based on comparable sales. During bub-
bles, appraisals incorporating inflated values from comparables are used to 
justify more lending, which fuels more home appreciation. (Herring & 
Wachter 1999, 19). This is particularly true for home lending because in-
come-based methods of evaluating risk do not apply. The incidence of 
fraudulent appraisals compounds the problem. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 30–
31). Banks view high and rising prices as reducing their portfolio risk be-
cause the collateral of their previous loans is now higher in value. (Herring 
& Wachter 1999, 11–12, 19–20). Later, after the bubble bursts, appraisals 
artificially prolong economic downturns when property values are starting 
to rise by limiting extensions of mortgages based on lower, outdated compa-
rables. Bank capital is now eroded and lenders withdraw from home lend-
ing. 
b. Securitization Safeguards 
During the housing bubble, the growth of nontraditional and subprime 
mortgages was financed through private-label mortgage-backed securitiza-
tion, which was mediated by Wall Street. Unlike Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae”) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”) securitizations of conforming prime loans, which guaran-
teed credit risk, private-label securitizations shifted both credit risk and pre-
payment risk onto private investors. (McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter 2009, 497). 
Accordingly, the architects of private-label securitization devised a number 
of techniques that appeared to reduce the credit risk associated with private-
label mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The most important of these tech-
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niques were structure, ratings, credit enhancements, and representations and 
warranties. 
i. Structure, Ratings and Pricing 
Perhaps the most novel innovation of private-label securitization was 
its use of structure to manage the credit risk presented by the underlying 
loans and collateral. This structure divided the bonds in any given issue into 
tranches, which were arranged in a waterfall along three dimensions: time 
(i.e., bond maturity), payment priority, and coupon. Tranching according to 
coupon and maturity sought to manage prepayment risk and credit risk; 
tranching according to payment priority also sought to manage credit risk. 
The tranches were rated by one or more of the three leading credit rating 
agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 
47). 
The top four investment-grade tranches were paid off first in order of 
sequence, starting with the AAA tranche, then the AA, and next the A 
tranches, and ending with the BBB. In the event of defaults in the underly-
ing loan pool securing the bonds, the top tranche was entitled to all cash 
flows until it was paid in full, followed by the next (AA) tranche, and so 
forth down the waterfall. Coupon rates were lowest for the AAA piece and 
rose along with risk as the credit rating of each tranche declined. (Engel & 
McCoy 2011, 47). The top tranches were primarily bought by overseas in-
vestors and by U.S. commercial banks, insurers, and pension plans, which 
were statutorily required to limit their bond purchases to investment-grade 
investments. (Bernanke et al. 2011, 1–2; Engel & McCoy 2011, 48, 58–59). 
More than 90% of the private-label MBS issued during the housing boom 
were rated AAA at inception. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, 14). 
Below the investment-grade tranches sat the mezzanine or junk-grade 
tranches (rated BB and below). (Engel & McCoy 2011, 47). These were 
mainly bought by collateralized debt obligation (CDO) managers, overseas 
investors, and hedge funds. (Bernanke et al. 2011, 14; Levitin & Wachter 
2013, 16). 
The bottom-most tranche was the equity or unrated tranche. This 
tranche paid the highest coupon rate and was the last to be paid off and the 
first to absorb losses. The bond underwriters or the issuer were supposed to 
retain the equity tranche in order to give both “skin in the game” to ensure 
the quality of the underlying loans. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 47). 
Meanwhile, most of the BBB pieces were securitized and sold. In fact, 
it was the marketing of the supposedly AAA tranches of the CDOs which 
were made up entirely of BBB pieces (supposedly the diversification of 
these triple B tranches would reduce their risk) that brought the extra capital 
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that fueled the final stages of the credit bubble and house price rise. (Cor-
dell, Huang & Williams 2012, 9–10; Levitin & Wachter 2013, 16). 
The safeguards imbedded in this structure broke down starting in 2007, 
when the private-label MBS market imploded. Chief among those safe-
guards were the credit ratings. The credit ratings on private-label MBS were 
compromised by the inherent conflict of interest of the rating agencies. The 
agencies competed with one another to win repeat business from underwrit-
ers and issuers, because the issuers were the ones who paid them. The Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission later reported that the agencies on occa-
sion overrode their risk forecasting models and raised ratings on behalf of 
their clients in order to land business and, with it, fees. (Engel & McCoy 
2011, 47–51). 
Despite the inherent conflicts in the issuer-pays system, investors re-
lied heavily on the ratings, in part because private-label securities were so 
opaque that investors could not evaluate their creditworthiness. The adop-
tion of the same ratings that were used for sovereign issuers and corporate 
bonds gave investors the impression that a AAA-rated subprime MBS was 
just as safe as a bond of a AAA-rated company. In January 2008, however, 
there were only twelve AAA-rated companies worldwide, while there were 
64,000 asset-backed instruments rated AAA. (Blankfein 2009, ¶ 7). In the 
mortgage-backed space, most of those private-label instruments were 
stuffed with dubious subprime or nontraditional loans with virtually no 
track record. Consequently, contrary to appearances, a AAA rating in the 
private-label MBS market was markedly weaker than the same rating on a 
corporate bond. (Levitin & Wachter 2013, 12). 
This came to light in 2007, when the rating agencies successively 
downgraded thousands of tranches of private-label MBS. As the value of 
the downgraded MBS plummeted in response, there was such a severe loss 
of confidence that by August 2007, the new-issuance market for private-
label MBS was dead. By late January 2008, Standard & Poor’s had down-
graded or threatened to downgrade almost 50% of the U.S. subprime mort-
gage-backed securities rated in the eighteen months beginning on January 1, 
2006 and more than one-third of CDOs sold during that period. (Engel & 
McCoy 2011, 72, 78, 87–88). 
In turn, the downgrades put pressure on banks to take write-downs on 
private-label bonds in their portfolios, eroding their capital, and required 
banks, insurers, and pension funds to offload any MBS downgraded below 
investment grade. (Id., 72–73). In these ways, the credit rating system that 
was touted as the bulwark of structured finance ended up magnifying the 
crisis by disastrous proportions. 
Meanwhile, the retained equity piece was supposed to protect investors 
in the higher tranches by giving incentives to the equity piece owners (sup-
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posedly the lenders or the underwriters) to minimize the default risk of the 
mortgages they securitized. But private-label MBS were highly leveraged, 
with the equity piece equaling 1.6% of the average MBS deal in 2005. 
(Begley & Purnanandam 2014). That left scant equity to absorb losses when 
defaults eventually hit. The high extent of defaults in the underlying collat-
eral5 demonstrated that the equity piece incentives failed to work as they 
should have. 
Some equity piece holders eventually realized that it was in their inter-
est to offload that credit risk as much as possible by selling the equity 
tranches for repackaging as CDOs. By 2005, investor conference call tran-
scripts were regularly containing statements by subprime lenders of their 
intent to resecuritize their residual tranches into CDOs. (Engel & McCoy 
2007, 2066–68 & n.129). In 2010, the Federal Reserve Board confirmed 
that this occurred, reporting to Congress that securitizers in the private-label 
residential MBS market “often ultimately succeeded in selling [the equity] 
piece to other market participants.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System 2010, 44). 
The equity piece problem intensified procyclicality in at least two 
ways. During the bubble, the presence of the equity investors encouraged 
investors to pile into the investment-grade tranches of private-label MBS, 
which increased capital flowing into the U.S. housing market and pushed up 
home prices. Later, the equity pieces’ failure to stem defaults on private-
label securitized mortgages led to massive write-downs and sell-offs of pri-
vate-label MBS, resulting in the insolvency of most top U.S. commercial 
banks. 
Finally, private-label MBS were underpriced for the credit risk they 
presented, which meant that the third safeguard—pricing—also failed to 
constrain risk. Risk-based pricing reflected the exuberant expectations of 
markets in general. Some insiders, famously, John Paulson for example, 
knew the risk was mispriced and selectively sold short the worst of the 
MBS. But generally these securities were marked to model and held in port-
folio. As long as housing prices continued to increase fueled by continued 
credit infusions and easing credit, the defaults to be expected from lowered 
lending standards were held at bay. 
ii. Credit Enhancements 
Structure, ratings, and pricing were not the only ways that Wall Street 
investment banks sought to contain the credit risk inherent in private-label 
                                                                                                                           
 5 By first quarter 2014, the cumulative serious delinquency (90+ day) rate for subprime mort-
gages originated in 2006 and 2007 exceeded 50%. (Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee 
2014, 13). 
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MBS. In addition, private-label bonds offered investors protection in the 
form of credit enhancements. These credit enhancements were intended to 
manage default risk by providing added cushions with which to absorb any 
losses on the underlying loans. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 48). 
Credit enhancements (over and above the senior-subordinate structure 
itself) take three main forms: overcollateralization, excess spread, and fi-
nancial guaranties, with the first two being most common. (Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System 2010, 41–43). In overcollateraliza-
tion, the total value of the collateral is to exceed the total amount outstand-
ing on a given MBS issue. Deals generally specify minimum overcollateral-
ization ratios that must be met. 
In excess spread, the weighted average coupon paid by the borrowers 
exceeds the coupon due on the bonds. The difference between the two (after 
deducting for servicer and trustee fees) is deposited into a loss absorption 
reserve for the protection of investors. (Mandel, Morgan & Wei 2012, 37). 
In a 2010 report to Congress, the Federal Reserve Board concluded 
that conditional cash flows in the form of excess spread “either failed ex 
ante to prevent originators and securitizers from originating low quality 
loans, or failed ex post to limit the losses from poor underwriting practices.” 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2010, 43 (emphasis in 
original)). The same problems appeared in overcollateralization. In theory, 
overcollateralization means that the first tier of any loan losses will be cov-
ered by the excess collateral. Defaults would have to reach higher-than-
expected levels before investors lost money on their bonds. But, like struc-
ture, overcollateralization has a procyclical bent. When property values are 
rising, overcollateralization gives investors confidence that they have addi-
tional protection from defaults. In declining markets, however, the total val-
ue of the underlying collateral can fall below the amount needed to maintain 
the minimum overcollateralization ratio. That, in turn, will require the secu-
ritization trust to pay off some of the outstanding debt owed to investors 
through asset sales in order to restore the ratio to its contractually obligated 
level. The fire sales of assets put downward pressure on asset prices gener-
ally, causing the collateral to further decline in value. (Bessis 2015, § 2.3.4, 
18). 
Financial guaranties by third-party monoline insurers, although less 
common, provided another layer of credit enhancements in a substantial 
number of private-label MBS. The strength of these guaranties hinged on 
the insurer’s credit rating. Before 2008, most monoline financial guaranty 
companies had stellar AAA ratings. Starting in January 2008, however, the 
rating agencies downgraded the bond insurers due to mounting claims for 
losses on the bonds they had guaranteed. Each downgrade pushed down the 
value of the bonds they had insured and placed those bonds in danger of 
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further downgrades. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 86; McCoy 2015, 1410). With 
each new round of downgrades, the value of the affected private-label MBS 
dropped, eating into the capital of banks who owned them and jeopardizing 
the banks’ solvency. In this way, financial guaranties proved procyclical in 
nature as well. 
iii. Representations and Warranties 
The representations and warranties included in the mortgage loan pur-
chase agreements for residential MBS were another feature of securitization 
deals intended to provide investors assurance that the underwriting stand-
ards were adequate. In these contractual provisions, originators make exten-
sive warranties about the quality and legality of the loans being sold into a 
pool. In addition, mortgage loan purchase agreements generally impose lia-
bility on originators for violations of representations and warranties. 
(McCoy & Wachter 2017, 7–8). Under the typical mortgage loan purchase 
agreement, originators must buy back any loans that are in breach of the 
representations and warranties. (Id., 17). In this way, representations and 
warranties are intended to provide both deterrence and compensation. 
In practice, however, representations and warranties had a damaging 
procyclical effect. Although contractually errors in reps and warranties 
would require lenders to buy back mortgages, the put back option is not 
exercised generally unless loans fail. Investors in MBS and insurers had 
such contractual agreements in place but did not generally test for whether 
significant breaches were occurring until after the default crisis. Thus, reck-
less lending practices, some of which included fraud, were not detected. 
The trust that derived from contractual obligations to buy back bad loans 
was not reinforced by verification. 
Instead, during the credit bubble, representations and warranties gave 
false confidence to MBS buyers that the underlying loans conformed to 
proper underwriting standards. This bullishness encouraged investors to 
overinvest in cut-price MBS. Meanwhile, rising home values disguised the 
empty value of representations and warranties during the bubble, delaying 
their enforcement until years after the bubble and deepening their cyclical 
effects. (Id., 3). The deluge of delinquent mortgages in 2007 and 2008 
demonstrated that private-label representations and warranties failed in their 
central mission. The existence of representations and warranties led to trust 
without verification, which encouraged the very practices which would un-
dermine the market. 
Eventually, after the bubble burst, investors did sue originators for the 
breach of private-label representations and warranties. Penalties were ex-
acted from originators in the billions of dollars. The result has been that 
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banks cut back their lending, even of Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) and government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) loans, as they no longer 
trust in the default insurance that FHA and the GSEs provide will hold in a 
future crisis. Bank lenders point to this litigation, combined with loan loss-
es, for their contraction of credit and tightening lending standards. After 
2008, this reaction was so pronounced that fears over buy-back exposure 
led to a drop in lending to creditworthy borrowers (Id., 2–3), which persists 
today. 
iv. Credit Default Swaps 
Many investors in private-label MBS did not rely solely on the safe-
guards imbedded in securitization deals such as structure, ratings, pricing, 
credit enhancements, and representations and warranties to protect them 
against credit risk. They hedged that risk as well. In particular, large inves-
tors in residential MBS sought assurance that they would not be hit by loss-
es in their warehoused loans by taking out credit default swaps (CDS). 
These CDS essentially were insurance against falling house prices and were 
provided by AIG and other financial companies. The growth in CDS was 
enabled by federal deregulation through new federal legislation enacted in 
2000.6 That change and a change in state regulation allowed these products 
to no longer be regulated as insurance, with the necessary reserves, but sole-
ly to be considered financial products,7 where pricing for risk alone mat-
tered. 
As long as a swap issuer such as AIG remained rated as AAA and the 
underlying bonds being protected maintained their value, the swaps needed 
no reserving. But these products were not adequately priced for risk, as they 
were priced assuming current housing prices would hold. By 2007, Gold-
man Sachs questioned whether AIG’s products were creditworthy and 
pressed for more collateral, thereby contributing to the unraveling of the 
credit spiral. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 73–74, 220–23; McCoy, Pavlov & 
Wachter 2009, 530; McDonald & Paulson 2014, 17–22). 
                                                                                                                           
 6 In the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Congress exempted all over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives, including OTC credit default swaps, from federal regulation under the 
Commodity Exchange Act. (Greenberger 2010, 99–115). 
 7 In 2000, the New York Insurance Department issued an opinion that naked CDS did not 
constitute “insurance” for purposes of regulation because the buyer did not own the reference 
bond being protected. Later, in 2004, the New York legislature amended its Insurance Code to 
make clear that CDS were not insurance. (Dinallo 2008; Gkonos & Cawley 2009, 3–4; New York 
Insurance Law § 6901(j)-(1); Office of the General Counsel, New York Insurance Department 
2000). 
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2. Procyclical Regulatory Interventions 
Elsewhere, we have detailed how federal regulators succumbed to the 
same false optimism that seized market actors in the period culminating in 
2008. In general, their false optimism manifested itself in deregulation, both 
of mortgage lending standards and the mortgage securitization market. (En-
gel & McCoy 2011, 157–223; McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter 2009, 509–10). 
However, throughout that period, federal regulators did employ two affirm-
ative regulatory techniques—capital adequacy and provisioning require-
ments—that were intended to prevent excessive risk-taking in mortgage 
lending by commercial banks. Perversely, both of these measures actually 
worsened cyclicality in mortgages, as we discuss. 
a. Risk-Based Capital 
In the period immediately surrounding the 2008 financial crisis, the 
Basel II capital accord set minimum capital standards for depository institu-
tions, including commercial banks. These capital requirements were intend-
ed to make banks resilient enough to absorb unexpected losses in their port-
folios. (Kroszner 2008). 
The “risk-weighting” feature of the Basel rules required maintenance 
of more capital for higher-risk assets but less for assets that were deemed 
safer. (McCoy 2016, 1187). This sliding scale of capital requirements was 
implemented by designating different risk weights for different asset clas-
ses. Basel II prescribed two techniques for deciding on the appropriate risk 
weights, unfortunately both of which contributed to procyclicality. Smaller 
and medium-sized banks were required to use the first method, which in-
volved deriving the risk weights from external credit ratings issued by 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. Because the credit ratings for pri-
vate-label MBS and CDOs turned out to be inflated, banks ended up hold-
ing too little capital against those assets and scores were undercapitalized 
when mortgage delinquencies spiked. (Id.; Repullo, Saurina & Trucharte 
2010, 662–63). 
The other risk-weighting system applied to the largest, internationally 
active banks and also proved procyclical. Under the Internal-Ratings-Based, 
or IRB, approach, Basel II permitted the largest banks to generate their risk 
weights through their own internal statistical models. Furthermore, IRB 
banks could use as little as five years of data when calculating their esti-
mates. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2001, 71). During the 
2000s credit bubble, this five-year look-back period could not capture the 
full business cycle for private-label MBS and CDOs, as they were new in-
struments. (Ren 2011, 21–22; Repullo, Saurina & Trucharte 2010, 661). The 
assumption was made that these new instruments did not increase default 
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risk, despite the easing of lending standards and the artificially elevated 
house prices and combined loan-to-value ratios affecting the underlying 
mortgages. In the process, the world’s largest, systemically important banks 
seriously underestimated the risk of their residential mortgage-related in-
vestments and ended up over-investing in those assets. When the eventual 
losses hit, almost all of the U.S. too-big-to-fail banks were left undercapital-
ized and required massive government bailouts. (Comstock 2011). 
Basel II’s risk-weighting system had another procyclical design flaw, 
which was that it assigned substantially lower risk weights to home mort-
gages that were securitized than to mortgages held in portfolio. This treat-
ment was based on the assumption that securitization removed the inherent 
credit risk in mortgages off of banks’ books. The resulting disparity in risk 
weights provided banks with a powerful incentive to make high-risk mort-
gages and then off-load those loans through securitization. (Jones 2000, 36–
37). Later, that strategy came back to haunt banks after investors filed suits 
against them for breach of representations and warranties. 
After 2008, in true procyclical fashion, the Basel capital standards 
dragged out the recovery process, as well. Because so many banks had de-
pleted their capital, they had to spend years replenishing their equity. New 
lending would have required those banks to raise even more capital. In the 
face of regulators’ capital demands and burdened with mortgage losses, 
bank lenders responded by going into a defensive crouch and curtailing 
lending. (Bai, Goodman & Zhu 2016). 
b. Provisioning 
Provisioning rules, which require banks to set aside loan loss reserves, 
were also implemented in a procyclical manner during the recent credit 
bubble. Provisioning requirements provide a counterpart to capital adequa-
cy requirements by requiring reserves for expected losses instead of unex-
pected ones. Like capital rules, provisioning is meant to bolster the ability 
of banks to withstand loan losses in the event of economic downturns. 
The provisioning rules in effect through 2008 only mandated reserves 
for losses incurred, not for losses anticipated in the future. (Zilberman & 
Tayler 2014, 2–4). This rear-view method exacerbated procyclicality by 
allowing banks to make excess numbers of loans during bubbles while 
maintaining inadequate reserves. Indeed, while the housing bubble was in-
flating from 2002 through mid-2006, U.S. banks increased their share of 
high-risk lending while cutting their loan loss reserves. (Levitin & Wachter 
2013, 12 fig. 1, 13 tbl. 1; McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter 2009, 497 fig. 1, 505 
fig. 3). This was possible because as housing prices increased, due to the 
eased standards, in fact, loan losses decreased. (Engel & McCoy 2011, 212 
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figs. 11.1 & 11.2). Later, in 2007 and 2008, reserves proved insufficient to 
cover bank lenders’ losses on home mortgages and related assets and those 
losses spilled over, wiping out banks’ equity cushions. During the after-
math, the regulatory and market pressure on banks to rebuild reserves plus 
capital pushed them into retrenchment including severe contraction in lend-
ing, because new loans would have required even more new loan loss re-
serves. 
C. Reducing Cyclicality in Access to Mortgage Credit 
In order to assure firmer footing for access to mortgage credit for the 
long term, it is not enough to end fraudulent practices and regulate the use 
of highly risky loan products. In addition, we need to iron out the boom and 
bust dynamics that make housing finance so volatile and potentially de-
structive of household wealth, both at home and abroad.8 This requires in-
troducing greater countercyclicality into the housing finance system—both 
through macroprudential tools and otherwise—while excising the procycli-
cal features of that system. 
Countercyclical regulation has two objectives: to make financial insti-
tutions more resilient to downturns and to prick incipient bubbles before 
they can do harm. (McCoy 2016, 1193–94). Although private-label residen-
tial mortgage securitization remains moribund, more work needs to be done 
to root out the extensive procyclicality inherent in that segment of the struc-
tured finance market. In contrast, countercyclical measures are underway in 
three other areas—namely, mortgage lending standards, capital adequacy 
requirements, and provisioning rules—and so we close this Article by fo-
cusing on a survey of those techniques. 
1. The Ability-to-Repay Rule 
The countercyclical toolkit includes a set of techniques known as sec-
toral tools that target industries that are uniquely vulnerable to bubbles. Not 
surprisingly, the most common of these sectoral tools address housing and 
mortgage finance. Sectoral tools in housing usually aim to stop the deterio-
ration in residential loan underwriting standards during economic upturns. 
The most important of these techniques includes maximum loan-to-value 
ratios, debt-to-income caps, and rules governing borrowers’ ability to repay. 
Due to concerns about credit access, the United States has declined to 
impose caps on loan-to-value ratios for residential loans as a matter of law. 
However, currently the only secondary market buyers—Fannie Mae, Fred-
                                                                                                                           
 8 In recent years, other countries without subprime and nontraditional mortgage loans, notably 
Ireland and Spain, similarly had a real estate bust. (Wachter 2015, 37–42). 
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die Mac, and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie 
Mae”)—do impose caps of their own, albeit without control over second-
lien lending, which is currently limited. 
In lieu of mandatory lending limits, Congress enacted an ability-to-
repay test for virtually all mortgage lenders in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010. The statute states that “no 
creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a 
reasonable and good faith determination . . . that, at the time the loan is con-
summated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan,” includ-
ing all associated taxes, insurance, and homeowners’ assessments. (Dodd-
Frank Act, § 1411(a)(2)). The new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) adopted an implementing regulation and the requirement took ef-
fect in January 2014. (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013). 
The ability-to-repay rule did not leave the meaning of a “reasonable 
determination” of ability to repay to lenders’ discretion, but couched it in 
objective requirements in certain important respects. For instance, the rule 
requires underwriting decisions to be based on “verified and documented 
information” about the borrower’s income and assets. This basically bans 
the low-documentation and no-documentation loans that mushroomed dur-
ing the housing bubble. The verification requirement significantly lowers 
the opportunities for loan fraud and should lower expected default rates on 
home mortgages. 
Another provision in the ability-to-repay requirement prohibits a tech-
nique that was commonly used during the housing bubble to make monthly 
payments appear smaller in order to qualify loan applicants. Under Dodd-
Frank, lenders must treat interest-only mortgages and negative amortization 
loans as fully amortizing when determining an applicant’s ability to repay. 
This will have the effect of making such determinations more conservative. 
Similarly, when evaluating ability to repay for adjustable-rate loans, lenders 
must base their determinations on monthly payments at the fully indexed 
rate, not a low initial teaser rate. 
In Dodd-Frank, Congress also harnessed stronger oversight and en-
forcement mechanisms to give these provisions bite. Lenders are subject to 
federal examination and enforcement for violations of the ability-to-repay 
rule.9 In addition, injured borrowers can sue lenders for violation of the rule 
for three years after origination and have a defense to foreclosure based on 
                                                                                                                           
 9 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) examines non-depository institutions 
and depository institutions with total assets of more than $10 billion for compliance with the abil-
ity-to-repay rule. State and federal prudential banking regulators supervise smaller depository 
institutions for adherence to the rule. (Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 1024(a)(1)(A), 1025–26). The Dodd-
Frank Act further authorizes state attorneys general to sue banks and nonbank mortgage lenders 
for violations of the ability-to-repay rule and other Bureau rules. (Id. § 1042(a)). 
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such violations without time limit. As a counterbalance to the threat of pri-
vate lawsuits, the regulations provide that any mortgage that meets the re-
quirements for a qualified mortgage10 gives the lender a presumption of 
compliance with the ability-to-repay rule. (Dodd-Frank Act § 1412). 
While the jury is still out, and while the lack of controls on CLTV may 
in time be a real concern, the objective requirements imbedded in the abil-
ity-to-repay rule and the prospect of government and private enforcement 
should help curb a race to the bottom in residential mortgage lending stand-
ards based on inability to repay. 
2. Capital Rules 
The Basel III Capital Accord was the first capital initiative to seriously 
seek to reverse the procyclicality in capital standards. As part of that effort, 
Basel III incorporates several provisions that are designed to make banks 
increase their capital during bull markets. Banks must now assess risks over 
the entire business cycle and not just five years. In addition, the new Basel 
Accord layers a simple 3% leverage ratio on top of the risk-based capital 
ratio. This new leverage ratio is harder to manipulate than the risk-based 
formulas, which should better help assure a meaningful capital floor. 
Meanwhile, the countercyclical buffer provision of Basel III imposes a capi-
                                                                                                                           
 10 That presumption is irrebuttable for all qualified mortgages except for higher-priced quali-
fied mortgages, which only afford a rebuttable presumption. For higher-priced covered transac-
tions, in order to rebut the presumption of ability to repay, a borrower must prove that the lender 
failed to make a reasonable and good-faith determination of his or her repayment ability at the 
time of consummation, by showing that his or her income, debt obligations, alimony, child sup-
port, and the borrower’s monthly payment (including mortgage-related obligations) on the mort-
gage at issue and on any simultaneous loans of which the lender was aware at consummation 
would leave the borrower with too little residual income or assets with which to meet living ex-
penses, including any recurring and material non-debt obligations of which the lender was aware 
at the time of consummation. The value of the dwelling (including any real property attached to 
the dwelling) that secured the loan is excluded from the calculation of residual assets. (12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026.43(e)(1)). A higher-priced covered transaction is defined to include most home mortgages 
that have an annual percentage rate that exceeds the average prime offer rate for a comparable 
transaction as of the date the interest rate is set by 1.5 or more percentage points for a first-lien 
covered transaction, or by 3.5 or more percentage points for a subordinate-lien covered transac-
tion. (Id. § 1026.43(b)(4)). Except for certain government-insured or government-guaranteed 
loans, in order for a mortgage to be a qualified mortgage, it must be fully amortizing, total points 
and fees must be limited to 3% of the total loan amount, the debt-to-income ratio may not exceed 
43%, and the loan term must be equal to or less than 30 years. In addition, the lender must verify 
and document the income and financial resources that the borrower relied on to qualify for the 
loan. Adjustable-rate loans must also be underwritten to the maximum interest rate during the first 
five years. Any prepayment penalties in qualified mortgages are heavily restricted. (Dodd-Frank 
Act §§ 1412, 1414(a)); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013). 
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tal surcharge on banks when credit over-expands.11 Basel III also authorizes 
regulators to assess an added capital conservation buffer of up to 2.5% on 
global systemically important banks, which would otherwise face limita-
tions on dividend payments to shareholders and bonuses to management if 
they failed to adopt that buffer. (Department of the Treasury et al. 2013, 
62031, 62171). Meanwhile, regulators require the largest banking organiza-
tions to conduct capital stress tests to evaluate whether they will have suffi-
cient capital to withstand periods of economic stress. (Group of Thirty 
2010, 45, 48–50). 
Observers have raised questions about whether these Basel reforms 
will work. (Admati & Hellwig 2013, 169; McCoy 2016, 1204–05 & n.118). 
Will the continued use of the internal-ratings-based approach leave the larg-
est, too-big-to-fail banks prone to future capital declines? Will Basel III re-
quire banks to hold sufficient capital? Will the countercyclical and capital 
conservation buffers be meaningful, since implementation is entrusted to 
regulators’ discretion? 
Furthermore, under Basel III, regulatory arbitrage remains a serious 
concern. The capital adequacy requirements in Basel III do not apply to in-
dependent nonbank lenders. (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System et al. 2016b, 37). Even if they did, it is unlikely that bank and non-
bank lenders would be subject to the same capital rules, because federal 
regulators have concluded that the rules that apply to banks do not fit the 
business models of large nonbank mortgage servicers. (Id., 37–39). In re-
cent years, the nonbank mortgage lending sector has resurged and has a 
growing market share. (McCoy & Wachter 2017, fig. 3). Despite this 
growth, loopholes in Basel III allow this sector to escape capital adequacy 
oversight. As a result, nonbank lenders operate without the countercyclical 
controls discussed above. This creates an unlevel playing field vis-à-vis 
their bank competitors, and one which becomes less level during a boom. 
It is unlikely that Congress will extend minimum capital requirements 
to nonbank mortgage lenders in the current political environment. Thus, the 
onus is on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and private-label inves-
tors to both maintain lending standards and to demand that their counterpar-
ties retain sufficient capital levels. Already, nonbank lenders are making 
growing numbers of FHA mortgages to weaker borrowers with FICO scores 
below 660. (Lux & Greene 2015, 18–25). In sum, federal regulators have 
made some progress toward introducing countercyclical elements to the 
capital regime for banks. That agenda has not been fully implemented, 
                                                                                                                           
 11 In October 2013, the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
promulgated a final rule authorizing a countercyclical buffer. (Department of the Treasury et al. 
2013, 62031, 62171). The rule was phased in starting in January 2016. 
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however, and remains subject to serious arbitrage concerns, particularly in 
the case of nonbank lenders. 
3. Provisioning 
Recent years have also seen progress toward adoption of countercycli-
cal provisioning requirements for residential mortgages. The purpose of 
these requirements is to require lenders to create higher loan loss reserves 
when credit is loose while allowing them to draw down those reserves when 
credit is tight. (McCoy 2016, 1206). 
Although more could be done, U.S. accounting standard-makers have 
recently incorporated countercyclical elements into their loan loss require-
ments. Under a new Financial Standards Accounting Board standard, effec-
tive 2019, lenders must base their loan loss reserves on expected credit 
losses, regardless whether losses have probably been incurred. (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System et al. 2016a; Financial Account-
ing Standards Board 2016, 1–2). In addition, lenders must record all pro-
jected losses over the maturity of loans at the time of origination. Although 
these measures represent progress, observers have criticized them as not 
sufficiently countercyclical because it may be years before some losses be-
come expected for residential mortgages, given their long maturity. Moreo-
ver, the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s new provisioning stand-
ards do not apply in the same way to nonbank lenders or aggregators be-
cause warehouse losses are de minimis and default losses are passed on to 
investors. 
CONCLUSION 
No discussion of access to mortgage credit can be complete without 
confronting the problem of cyclicality. Housing finance is inherently prone 
to boom and bust cycles that can decimate the homeownership tenure and 
prospects of millions of U.S. households. During expansions, mortgage 
bubbles place large numbers of borrowers in jeopardy of foreclosure due to 
aggressive marketing of loans that they cannot afford. Other borrowers who 
do retain their homes lose substantial sums of wealth as their home equity 
vanishes. Later, after the bubble bursts, the severe contraction in credit 
causes loan applicants who would normally qualify for mortgages in normal 
times to be turned down and shut out of home purchases. 
If homeownership is to attain solid footing, mitigating the cyclicality 
in the housing finance system will be imperative. That will require rooting 
out procyclical practices and requirements that fuel booms and busts. In 
their place, countercyclical measures must be instituted to modulate the 
highs and lows in the lending cycle. In the process, the goal is not to max-
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imize homeownership per se; rather, it is to ensure that residential mortgag-
es are made on safe and affordable terms. 
To date, some progress has been made in addressing the procyclical 
aspects of bank regulation that affect mortgage lending. The Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) ability-to-repay rule will help prevent 
another race to the bottom in lending standards. During expansions, FASB’s 
new provisioning standard will prod lenders to establish higher loan loss 
reserves that reflect expected future credit losses. Meanwhile, federal bank-
ing regulators have revamped the capital adequacy rules for banks by super-
imposing a simple leverage ratio on top of the risk-based capital rules, by 
raising minimum capital requirements through countercyclical and capital 
conservation buffers and otherwise, and by requiring capital stress tests for 
larger banks. However, regulatory arbitrage remains a serious concern be-
cause market share is increasingly shifting to nonbank mortgage originators 
who are not subject to the capital adequacy rules. 
Taming procyclicality in industry practices in housing finance is 
much farther behind and will require significantly more work. There is no 
easy fix for the procyclical effect of mortgage appraisals because appraisals 
are based on neighboring comparables. Similarly, procyclicality will require 
serious attention if the private-label securitization market returns. Although 
the Dodd-Frank Act made modest reforms designed at curbing inflation of 
credit ratings, the issuer-pays system that drives grade inflation remains in 
place. Similarly, underpricing the risk of MBS and CDS will continue to be 
a problem in the absence of an effective short-selling mechanism and the 
effective identification of market-wide leverage. 
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